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ABSTRACT. I present a solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with the consensual 
emerald case and describe then a set of relevant urn analogies and situations. These latter experiments 
make it easier to diagnose the flaw in the thirder's line of reasoning. I discuss in detail the root cause 
of the flaw in the argument for 1/3 which is an erroneous assimilation with a repeated experiment. 
Lastly, I discuss an informative variant of the original Sleeping Beauty experiment that casts light on 
the diagnosis of the fallacy in the argument for 1/3. 
 
 
 
1. Experiments and situations 
 
Experiment 1: an urn contains 2 red balls and 1 green balls. You draw a ball at random from the urn. 
You evaluate the probability of drawing a red or a green ball. Let P(R) and P(G) denote respectively 
the probability of drawing a red or a green ball. Reasoning I: P(R) = 2/(2+1) = 2/3 and P(G) = 1/(2+1) 
= 1/3. 
 
Situation 1: the emerald case (Leslie 1996, p. 20): 'At some point in time, three humans would each 
be given an emerald. Several centuries afterwards, when a completely different set of humans was 
alive, five thousands humans would again each be given an emerald in the experiment. You have no 
knowledge, however, of whether your century is the earlier century in which just three people were to 
be in this situation, or the later century in which five thousand were to be in it'. Let P(T) be the 
probability that your emerald comes from the set of three humans and P(F) the probability that your 
emerald originates from the set of five thousand humans. Reasoning I: P(T) = 3/(3+5000) = 3/5003 
and P(F) = 5000/(3+5000) = 5000/5003. 
 
Experiment 2: The content of an urn depends on the flipping of a fair coin. If Heads then the urn 
contains 1 red ball; if Tails then the urn contains 1 red ball and 1 green ball. You evaluate the 
probability of drawing a red or a green ball. Reasoning I: if the coin has landed Heads then the 
probability of drawing a red ball is 1; else if the coin has landed Tails then the probability of drawing a 
red ball is 1/2. In this latter case, we face a situation which is in all respects analogous to experiment 1 
with an urn that contains 1 red ball and 1 green ball, except that the probability of Tails is 1/2, thus 
yielding a probability of drawing a red ball that equals 1/2x1/(1+1) = 1/2x1/2. On the other hand, if the 
coin has landed Heads then the probability of drawing a green ball is 0; else if the coin has landed 
Tails then the probability of drawing a green ball is 1/2. This latter case is analogous to experiment 1 
with an urn that contains 1 red ball and 1 green ball, except that the probability of Tails is 1/2, thus 
yielding a probability of drawing a green ball that equals 1/2x1/(1+1) = 1/2x1/2. Hence P(R) = 1x1/2 + 
1/2x1/2 = 3/4 ; P(G) = 0x1/2 + 1/2x1/2 = 1/4. Reasoning II: if the experiment is repeated n times, say 
1000 times then there will be in total 1000 (1x1000x1/2+1x1000x1/2) red balls and 500 (1x1000x1/2) 
green balls. According to reasoning II this experiment is equivalent, in the long run, to a type 1 
experiment with an urn that contains 1500 balls from whose 1000 red balls and 500 green balls. Hence 
P(R) = 1000/1500 = 2/3; and P(G) = 500/1500 = 1/3. 
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Experiment 3: experiment 2 repeated 1000 times. A type 2 experiment is repeated n times, from T1 to 
Tn. Let n = 1000. Reasoning I: on each drawing, the odds are the same as in experiment 2. Hence P(R) 
= 1x1/2 + 1/2x1/2 = 3/4 ; P(G) = 0x1/2 + 1/2x1/2 = 1/4. Reasoning II: in this case, there will be in 
total circa 1000 (2x1000x1/2) red balls and 500 (1x1000x1/2) green balls. Thus one finds oneself in a 
situation which is equivalent to a type 1 experiment. Consequently: P(R) = 1000/1500 = 2/3; and P(G) 
= 500/1500 = 1/3. 
 
Experiment 4: an urn contains 1 red ball and 1 green ball. If Heads then due to a filtering effect, you 
cannot see nor feel green balls and you can only see and feel 1 red ball. If Tails then there is no filter 
effect and you can see and feel 1 red ball and 1 green ball. Your task is to evaluate the probability of 
drawing a red or a green ball. Reasoning I: just as in experiment 2, if the coin has landed Heads then 
the probability of drawing a red ball is 1; else if the coin has landed Tails then the probability of 
drawing a red ball is 1/2. In addition, if the coin has landed Heads then the probability of drawing a 
green ball is 0; else if the coin has landed Tails then the probability of drawing a green ball is 1/2. 
Hence P(R) = 1x1/2 + 1/2x1/2 = 3/4 ; P(G) = 0x1/2 + 1/2x1/2 = 1/4. Reasoning II: if the experiment is 
repeated n times, say 1000 times then I will see in total 1000 (1x1000x1/2+1x1000x1/2) red balls and 
500 (1x1000x1/2) green balls. According to reasoning II, in the long run, this experiment is equivalent 
to a type 1 experiment,  with an urn that contains 1500 balls from whose 1000 red balls and 500 green 
balls. Hence P(R) = 1000/1500 = 2/3; and P(G) = 500/1500 = 1/3. 
 
Experiment 5: experiment 4 repeated 1000 times. A type 4 experiment is repeated n times, from T1 to 
Tn. Let n = 1000. In this case, I will draw in total circa 1000 (2x1000x1/2) red balls and 500 
(1x1000x1/2) green balls. Reasoning I: on each drawing, the odds are the same as in experiment 4. 
Hence P(R) = 1x1/2 + 1/2x1/2 = 3/4 ; P(G) = 0x1/2 + 1/2x1/2 = 1/4. Reasoning II: one finds oneself in 
a situation which is equivalent to a type 1 experiment. Consequently: P(R) = 1000/1500 = 2/3; and 
P(G) = 500/1500 = 1/3. 
 
Situation 4a: Sleeping Beauty problem (Elga 2000, p. 143): 'Some researchers are going to put you to 
sleep. During the two days that your sleep will last, they will briefly wake you up either once or twice, 
depending on the toss of a fair coin (Heads: once; Tails: twice). After each waking, they will put you 
to back to sleep with a drug that makes you forget that waking'. Once awakened, to what degree 
should Sleeping Beauty believe that (i) it is a Heads-waking and (ii) the coin has landed Heads?1 'First 
answer: 1/2, of course! Initially you were certain that the coin was fair, and so initially your credence 
in the coin's landing Heads was 1/2. Upon being awakened, you receive no new information (...). So 
your credence in the coin's landing Heads ought to remain 1/2. Second answer: 1/3, of course! Imagine 
the experiment repeated many times. Then in the long run, about 1/3 of the wakings would be Heads-
wakings (...). So on any particular waking, you should have credence 1/3 that that waking is Heads-
waking, and hence have credence 1/3 in the coin's landing Heads on that trial'.  
 
Situation 4b: Sleeping Beauty in Flatland: Some researchers give you first a cube and then put you to 
sleep. During your sleep they place you with the cube, depending on the toss of a fair coin, either in 
Flatland (Heads) or in Spaceland (Tails). After that, they wake you up once. Once awakened in 
Flatland (Heads), you will see a 2-dimensional object, a square. Conversely, if awakened in 
Spaceland, you will see a 3-dimensional object, a cube. You evaluate (i) the probability of being 
awakened in Flatland or in Spaceland and (ii) the probability that the coin has landed Heads. 
 
 
2. The reasoning 
 
                                                          
1
 Adapted from Elga (2000). Elga's original text: 'When you are first [my emphasis] awakened, to what degree 
ought you believe that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads?'. Considering here any waking (Heads-waking on 
Monday, Tails-waking on Monday or Tails-waking on Tuesday) is more general and equally allowed by the 
formulation of the problem, since all wakings are indistinguishable. 
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From the foregoing experiments and situations, the following reasoning can be straightforwardly 
derived (assuming that steps (6) and (11) are true): 
 
(1) situation 1 (emerald case) is analogous to experiment 1 analogy 
(2) reasoning I applies to experiment 1 premise 
(3) ∴ reasoning I applies to situation 1 (emerald case) from (1),(2) 
(4) either reasoning I or reasoning II applies to experiment 2 dichotomy 
(5) according to reasoning II from experiment 2, experiment 3 (iterated 
experiment 2) is structurally identical to experiment 1 
premise 
(6) experiment 3 (iterated experiment 2) is not structurally identical to 
experiment 1 
premise 
(7) ∴ reasoning II does not apply to experiment 2 from (5),(6) 
(8) ∴ reasoning I applies to experiment 2 from (4),(7) 
(9) either reasoning I or reasoning II applies to experiment 4 dichotomy 
(10) according to reasoning II in experiment 4, experiment 5 (iterated experiment 
4) is structurally identical to experiment 1 
premise 
(11) experiment 5 (iterated experiment 4) is not structurally identical to 
experiment 1 
premise 
(12) ∴ reasoning II does not apply to experiment 4 from (10),(11) 
(13) ∴ reasoning I applies to experiment 4 from (9),(12) 
(14) situation 4a (Sleeping Beauty problem) is analogous to experiment 4 analogy 
(15) reasoning I applies to experiment 4 from (13) 
(16) ∴ reasoning I applies to situation 4a (Sleeping Beauty problem) from (14),(15) 
(17) situation 4b (Sleeping Beauty in Flatland) is analogous to experiment 4 analogy 
(18) reasoning I applies to experiment 4 from (13) 
(19) ∴
 reasoning I applies to situation 4b (Sleeping Beauty in Flatland) from (17),(18) 
 
Assuming the hypothesis that steps (6) and (11) are true, I take it that the whole reasoning (1)-(19) 
should be consensual. However, the current state of the philosophical debate is that step (6) should be 
regarded as more or less consensual while, on the other hand, step (11) remains at this stage fully 
controversial. For this reason, I shall now concentrate on the rationale that makes these two specific 
steps true. 
 
 
3. A solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem 
 
Let us begin with step (6). Step (6) states thus against reasoning II that experiment 3 (iterated 
experiment 2) is not structurally identical to experiment 1. Reasoning II rests on the fact that 
experiment 2 can be repeated and the corresponding situation is then analogous to a type 1 experiment 
with 1500 balls from whose 1000 red and 500 green balls. 
I shall argue that step (6) is true and that reasoning II in experiment 2 is fallacious. For the sake of 
clarity, let us draw first a distinction between red-HEADS (red balls created after the coin has landed 
Heads), red-TAILS (red balls created in the Tails case) and green-TAILS (green balls created in the 
Tails case) balls. In this context, it should be clear that there only exists red-HEADS, red-TAILS and 
green-TAILS balls in experiments 2 and 3. 
The intuition underlying reasoning II in experiments 2 and 3 is that one is entitled to add red and 
green balls to compute frequencies. However, I shall argue that this intuition is misleading. With our 
terminology, it means that one feels intuitively entitled to add red-HEADS, red-TAILS and green-
TAILS balls. Let us begin with red-HEADS balls. In the current context, red-HEADS balls can be 
considered properly as single objects. Thus you are entitled to envisage drawing isolately red-HEADS 
balls and these latter can acceptably be seen as single objects. By contrast, it appears that red-TAILS 
balls are quite undissociable from green-TAILS balls. For you cannot draw a red-TAILS ball without 
drawing the associated green-TAILS ball. And conversely, you cannot pick a green-TAILS ball 
without picking the associated red-TAILS ball. From this viewpoint, it is mistaken to consider red-
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TAILS and green-TAILS balls as separate objects. The correct intuition is that the association of a red-
TAILS and a green-TAILS ball constitute one single object, in the same sense as red-HEADS balls 
constitute single objects. And red-TAILS and green-TAILS balls are best seen intuitively as parts of 
one single object, whose constituents are one red-TAILS and one green-TAILS ball. In other words, 
red-HEADS balls and, on the other hand, red-TAILS and green-TAILS balls, cannot be considered as 
objects of the same type for frequency probability purposes. And this situation motivates the fact that 
one is not entitled to add red-HEADS, red-TAILS and green-TAILS balls to compute frequencies. If 
experiment 2 is repeated, one is not entitled to add  (i) red-HEADS and red-TAILS balls and (ii) red-
HEADS and green-TAILS balls to compute the corresponding frequencies. For in both cases, you add 
objects of intrinsically different types, i.e. you add one single object with the mere part of another 
single object. It follows that reasoning II in experiment 2 is erroneous. Hence, reasoning I is correct. 
As we have seen, the whole idea of reasoning as if experiment 2 were repeated is related to the 
frequentist interpretation of probabilities (Hájek 2002) and the repeatability of thought experiments. 
The upshot, however, is that this latter interpretation of probabilities should not be adopted 
unrestricted. 
 
Let us consider, second, step (11). Step (11) claims contra reasoning II that experiment 5 (iterated 
experiment 4) is not structurally identical to experiment 1. In this context, reasoning II is based on the 
fact that experiment 4 can be repeated and the corresponding situation is then analogous to a type 1 
experiment with 1500 balls from whose 1000 red and 500 green balls. The targeted situation is the 
Sleeping Beauty Problem. 
On closer scrutiny, it appears that experiment 4 is the same as experiment 2, except that a selection 
effect (Leslie 1989, Bostrom 2002) is present in the former case. In effect, if the coin has landed 
Heads then a selection effect precludes you from feeling and seeing the green ball. In this context, 
from the observer's standpoint, the situation is identical to experiment 2. However, if the coin has 
landed Tails, there is no selection effect and you can feel and see properly both red and green balls. 
Now the diagnosis of the fallacy in reasoning II is the same as in experiment 2. What is at the origin 
of the problem is that each red ball is intuitively considered as a single object. But this intuition proves 
to be mistaken. And what creates the illusion is that one seems pre-theoretically entitled to add red 
balls and green ones to compute frequencies. But what the above analysis reveals, is that one must 
distinguish between red-HEADS, red-TAILS and green-TAILS balls. Once this step accomplished, it 
is patent that the correct intuition is that red-HEADS can be seen as single objects, while red-TAILS 
and green-TAILS balls must be considered properly as mere parts of single objects which are on a par 
with red-HEADS objects. In sum, red-HEADS balls and, on the other hand, red-TAILS and green-
TAILS balls, cannot be considered as objects as the same type. The upshot is that one is no longer 
entitled to add (i) red-HEADS and red-TAILS balls and (ii) red-HEADS and green-TAILS balls, to 
compute frequencies. Consequently, reasoning II appears now fallacious, making it clear that 
experiment 5 is not analogous to experiment 1. What remains thus in force is reasoning I. 
 
The situation of the original Sleeping Beauty problem parallels the urn analogy from experiment 4. 
In the Sleeping Beauty problem, it appears that Beauty faces a selection effect in the case where the 
coin lands Heads. For in this last case, Beauty is not awakened on Tuesday. By contrast, Beauty faces 
no selection effect in the Tails case, since she is awakened on both Monday and Tuesday. In the 
Sleeping Beauty experiment, the time variable includes two temporal locations: Monday and Tuesday. 
In the Heads case, Sleeping Beauty perceives the first time location (Monday) but is unable to 
perceive the second location (Tuesday). However, in the Tails case, she is able to perceive both time 
locations (Monday and Tuesday). 
Let now P(M) be the probability of being awakened on Monday and P(T) be the probability of being 
awakened on Tuesday. Given the above set of experiments and situations, we are now in a position to 
state the argument for 1/3 in the Sleeping Beauty problem more accurately: 
 
(20) if the Sleeping Beauty experiment is repeated n times  hypothesis 
(21)  then there will be 1/3 Heads-wakings on Monday, 1/3 Tails-
wakings on Monday and 1/3 Tails-wakings on Tuesday 
 
(22)  then the experiment will be structurally identical to experiment 1  
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(23) in experiment 1, P(R) = 2/3 and P(G) = 1/3  
(24) in the Sleeping Beauty experiment, P(M) = 2/3 and P(T) = 1/3 from (22),(23) 
(25) ∴ P(TAILS) = P(M) = 2/3 and P(HEADS) = P(T) = 1/3 from (24) 
 
From the above, it should be clear that the argument for 1/3 in the Sleeping Beauty problem identifies 
itself with the above-mentioned reasoning II in experiments 2 and 4. The argument for 1/3 rests 
crucially on the fact that if experiment 4 is repeated, it can be assimilated to a type 1 experiment. 
Now the erroneous step in the thirder's line of reasoning can be accurately identified. The erroneous 
step is the inference from (21) to (22), namely the consideration that if the experiment is repeated n 
times, it is equivalent to a type 1 experiment. And the diagnosis of the fallacy in the argument for 1/3 
now parallels the flaw in reasoning II in experiments 2 and 4. What creates the problem is the 
misleading intuition that each waking is intuitively considered as a single event. And the apparent 
plausibility of the argument for 1/3 comes from the fact that one feels pre-theoretically entitled to add 
Monday wakings and Tuesday wakings to compute frequencies. However, as underlined above, one 
must distinguish first between Monday-HEADS, Monday-TAILS and Tuesday-TAILS wakings. It 
follows then that Monday-HEADS wakings and, on the other hand, Monday-TAILS and Tuesday-
TAILS wakings cannot be properly considered as objects as the same type. For Monday-TAILS 
wakings are undissociable from Tuesday-TAILS wakings. And this finally prohibits adding (i) 
Monday-HEADS and Monday-TAILS wakings and (ii) Monday-HEADS and Tuesday-TAILS 
wakings to compute frequencies. This renders reasoning II fallacious and finally does justice to 
reasoning I. 
 
 
4. Lessons of Sleeping Beauty in Flatland 
 
Lastly, the Sleeping Beauty in Flatland variant of the original problem is worth taking into account. 
Flatland is a small book written by Edwin E. Abbott and published in 1884, which has undergone an 
increasing popularity, until our present day. Although it is also a social satire on the rigidities of 
Victorian England, the main concern of Flatland is with introducing the geometry of higher 
dimensions. The protagonist of the book, A Square, is an inhabitant of a 2-dimensional world, which 
only contains flat individuals. Abbott investigates what it would mean for such inhabitants to interact 
with beings and objects from of a 3-dimensional world. The underlying analogy, which also applies to 
our current situation, is that the inhabitants of a n-dimensional world would face a situation of the 
same nature when interacting with objets of a n+1 dimensional world. In this context, Flatland can 
also be regarded as an introductory text to 4-dimensional objects and higher-dimensional polytopes. 
In the Sleeping Beauty in Flatland variant, it appears that when Beauty is thrown in Flatland in the 
Heads case, she faces an observation selection effect that precludes her from perceiving the 3rd spatial 
dimension of the cube and causes her seeing a mere square. A 3-dimensional object which is 
transferred in a 2-dimensional world such as Flatland is seen there as a 2-dimensional object. Its 
spatial 3rd dimension is hidden to all observers. By contrast, when the same object is plugged into a 3-
dimensional world, it appears in its entirety as a 3-dimensional object. And when Beauty is plugged 
accordingly into the 3-dimensional world of Spaceland in the Tails case, she is enabled to perceive the 
cube with all its three dimensions. 
There is something puzzling with the Sleeping Beauty in Flatland variant. Our prima facie reasoning 
is that if the experiment is repeated, say 1000 times, Beauty will see circa 500 squares and 500 cubes, 
a line of reasoning quite in line with reasoning I and the conclusion that P(HEADS) = P(TAILS) = 1/2. 
By contrast, our pre-theoretical intuition is that there is something which impedes to get reasoning II 
moving in the Sleeping Beauty in Flatland variant. Hence, reasoning II seems intuitively less natural in 
the Sleeping Beauty in Flatland variant than in the original Sleeping Beauty problem. This intriguing 
phenomenon stands in need of an explanation. 
Let us begin with showing how the Sleeping Beauty in Flatland variant is structurally analogous to 
experiment 4. Let us first term a quasi-cube an object that is a cube one face of which is missing. Now 
it is patent that when Sleeping Beauty sees a cube in Spaceland, she also sees an object whose 
constituents are a square and a quasi-cube. Let us forget about cubes for a while and concentrate on 
squares and quasi-cubes. Let us also draw a distinction between square-HEADS, square-TAILS and 
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quasi-cube-TAILS. With the relevant machinery at hand, we are now in a position to reframe 
reasoning II in the Sleeping Beauty in Flatland variation. For we can now imagine the experiment 
repeated many times. It appears then that in the long run, Beauty will see 500 square-HEADS, 500 
square-TAILS and 500 quasi-cube-TAILS, giving now apparently strong grounds for the conclusion, 
in line with reasoning II, that P(HEADS) = 1/3. At this stage, the same diagnosis as above of the flaw 
in reasoning II in experiment 4 applies straightforwardly. Now it appears that square-HEADS and, on 
the other hand, square-TAILS and quasi-cube-TAILS, cannot be considered as objects of the same 
type. The upshot is that one is no longer entitled to add (i) square-HEADS and square-TAILS and (ii) 
square-HEADS and quasi-cube-TAILS to compute frequencies. This undercuts reasoning II and 
finally vindicates reasoning I. 
Now it should be clear that the Sleeping Beauty in Flatland variant is the same as in the original 
Sleeping Beauty problem, to the difference that the variable is spatial in the Sleeping Beauty in 
Flatland variant while it is temporal in the original Sleeping Beauty experiment. In this context, the 
Sleeping Beauty in Flatland variant appears now informative. In effect, in this latter case, one does not 
feel pre-theoretically entitled to add square-HEADS, square-TAILS and quasi-cube-TAILS. Rather, 
one feels intuitively entitled to add squares and cubes, for the reason that we are only familiar with 
these latter objects. In particular, quasi-cubes are unfamiliar to us, being uncommon objects and 
concepts. Now adding squares and quasi-cubes is for us unnatural. This explains why, although 
structurally identical to the original Sleeping Beauty experiment, the Sleeping Beauty in Flatland 
variant is not equally suited for reasoning II. 
 
Finally, the lesson of the Sleeping Beauty Problem is that our current and familiar objects or 
concepts such as balls, wakings, etc. should not be considered as the sole relevant classes of objects 
for probability purposes. For in certain situations, in order to reason properly, it is also necessary to 
take into account somewhat unfamiliar objects such as pairs of indissociable balls, pairs of mutually 
unseparable wakings, 3-dimensional complements of 2-dimensional objects such as quasi-cubes, etc. 
Once this goodmanian step accomplished, we should be less vulnerable to certain subtle cognitive 
traps in probabilistic reasoning.2 
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